We study a model of signaling in which agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions. An agent's natural action is the action taken in the absence of signaling concerns. Her gaming ability parameterizes the cost of increasing the action. Equilibrium behavior muddles information across dimensions. As incentives to take higher actions increase-due to higher stakes or more manipulable signaling technology-more information is revealed about gaming ability, and less about natural actions. We explore a new externality: showing agents' actions to additional observers can worsen information for existing observers. Applications to credit scoring, school testing, and web searching are discussed.
I. Introduction
In many signaling environments, there is a concern that agents' gaming can lead to "muddled" information. Google tries to prevent search engine optimization from contaminating the relevance of its organic search results. The Fair Isaac Corporation keeps its precise credit-scoring formula secret to make it more difficult for consumers to game the algo-rithm. Educators worry that rich students have better access to SAT tutoring and test preparation than poor students, and so the test may be a flawed measure of underlying student quality. Indeed, in March 2014, the College Board announced plans to redesign the SAT, in part to "rein in the intense coaching and tutoring on how to take the test that often gave affluent students an advantage" (Lewin 2014) .
In canonical signaling models (e.g., Spence 1973 ) standard assumptions such as the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition ensure the existence of separating equilibria: equilibria that fully reveal agents' private information. So the only welfare cost from gaming-that is, strategic behavior-is through an increase in costly effort. Even though gaming may induce an inefficient rat race, it does not lead to a reduction in market information.
This paper studies how gaming can worsen market information. We develop a model of signaling in which agents have two-dimensional types. Both dimensions affect an agent's cost of sending a one-dimensional signal. The first dimension is an agent's natural action, which is the action taken (synonymous with the signal sent) in the absence of signaling concerns. The second dimension is an agent's gaming ability, which parameterizes the costs of increasing actions beyond the natural level. In the credit-scoring application, the signal is an agent's credit score, the natural action is the score the agent would obtain if this score were not disseminated, and gaming ability determines how costly it is for an agent to increase her score. In the testing application, the natural action is the test score a student would receive without studying, and gaming ability captures how easily the student can increase her score by studying.
We assume that agents care about influencing a market's belief about their quality on one of the two dimensions, which we refer to as the dimension of interest.
1 Situations abound in which the dimension of interest is the natural action. For example, people with higher natural credit scores default less often on loans; the credit market does not care about gaming ability because this trait merely reflects one's knowledge about how to manipulate credit scores. Search engine optimization is similar: higher natural actions correspond to more relevant web pages. Yet, there are contexts in which the dimension of interest is the gaming ability. In the testing environment, gaming ability would not be of interest to the market if it solely represented "studying to the test," but colleges or employers might value gaming ability if it correlated with the ability to study more broadly. Or, in a job-market signaling model, gaming ability may be correlated with intelligence and work ethic, while the natural actionthe amount of education that would be acquired if it were irrelevant to job searching-may capture a dimension of preferences for schooling that is unrelated to job performance.
We explore how heterogeneous natural actions and gaming ability interact in determining the market's information. In our formulation, detailed in Section II, each dimension of an agent's type-natural action or gaming ability-satisfies a single-crossing property. Thus, the effects of heterogeneity on any one dimension alone are familiar. Indeed, if we were to assume homogeneity of natural actions and the dimension of interest to be gaming ability, then our model would be similar to a canonical signaling environment such as that of Spence (1973) . If instead gaming ability were homogeneous and the dimension of interest were the natural action, then our model would share similarities with, for example, Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) . 2 In both cases, full separation would be possible.
With two dimensions of heterogeneity, the market is typically faced with muddled information. Even though the market would like to evaluate an agent on her natural action (or gaming ability), the information revealed about this dimension of an agent's type is muddled with irrelevant information about her gaming ability (or natural action). While agents who take higher actions will tend to have both higher natural actions and higher gaming ability, any observed action will generally not reveal either dimension. Intermediate actions might come from an agent with a high natural action and a low gaming ability, an agent with a low natural action and a high gaming ability, or an agent who is in between on both.
A key contribution of this paper is to identify a relationship between the signaling costs of cross types-pairs in which one has higher natural action but lower gaming ability than the other. Our central assumption, formalized in assumption 1 (part 4) in Section II, is that at low levels of signaling, differences in marginal cost are driven by differences in natural actions; at higher levels of signaling, they depend more on differences in gaming ability. In other words, as more gaming occurs, gaming ability becomes relatively more important in determining signaling costs.
The core of our analysis concerns comparative statics on equilibrium information on the dimension of interest. We establish that when agents' incentives to take high actions increase-because the stakes in signaling go up, for instance, or the costs of signaling go down-the muddled information reveals more about an agent's gaming ability and less about her natural action. Hence, as a search engine such as Google becomes more popular and the stakes for websites to game its algorithm grow, 2 Other signaling models with heterogeneity in natural actions include Bernheim (1994) and Bernheim and Severinov (2003) . There is also a parallel in the literature on earnings management, wherein a market is assumed to observe a firm's reported earnings but not its "natural earnings" (e.g., Stein 1989) .
Google searches can become less informative-even after Google adjusts its algorithm to account for this extra gaming. Notwithstanding, our analysis clarifies that while higher stakes lead to less information on one dimension, they generate more information on the other.
Section III establishes these comparative statics globally in a canonical 2 Â 2 setting and provides general results for small and large signaling stakes. Section IV develops a linear-quadratic-elliptical specification: signaling benefits are linear in the market belief, costs are quadratic, and the types are jointly elliptically distributed. This specification affords a sharp equilibrium characterization and additional comparative-statics results.
In Section V.A we consider the value of giving agents more information about how to manipulate signals, for example by making the inner working of the signaling technology more transparent. A more transparent algorithm will lower the costs of signaling for all agents, increasing the incentives to take higher actions. Therefore, when the dimension of interest is the natural action, the market becomes less informed as the algorithm is made more transparent. This analysis explains why evaluators often try to obscure the details of their evaluation metrics, such as the College Board keeping past SAT questions secret for many years: it improves the informativeness of its test. 3 It bears emphasis that it is not gaming per se that reduces information about natural actions; for example, if websites were all equally prone to engage in search engine optimization, then their efforts could wash out and leave observers well informed. Rather, muddled information is driven by the fact that there is unobservable heterogeneity across agents in how prone they are to gaming. This provides an explanation for why, in addition to announcing changes to the SAT itself in March 2014, the College Board also announced provision of free online test preparation to "level the playing field." Such a policy disproportionately helps those with low intrinsic gaming ability (i.e., poor families). By reducing heterogeneity on gaming ability, it should improve market information about natural actions.
In Section V.B we explore a novel trade-off in making a signal available to new observers. With more observers tracking her actions, an agent's stakes in signaling grow. At higher stakes, the signal becomes less informative about the natural action. So there is a negative informational externality on those observers who already had access to the signal. In the context of credit scoring, allowing employers and insurance companies to use credit reports will improve information in those markets, but at a cost of reducing the information available in the loan market. The social value of information across markets can decline after the signal is made available to new markets.
Muddled information-information loss on the dimension of interest owing to other dimensions of private information-is not a new phenomenon in signaling environments. 4 See, among others, Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) , Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , Esteban and Ray (2006), and Bagwell (2007) in the economics literature, and Dye and Sridhar (2008) and Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic (2014) in the earnings-management accounting literature. As already mentioned, our main contribution is developing the comparative statics of market information when it is muddled and uncovering the general forces underlying these comparative statics.
The closest antecedent in this respect is the innovative work of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) . They study a linear-quadratic-normal model (also seen in Bénabou and Tirole [2006] ) that is related to our linearquadratic-elliptical specification in Section IV with the dimension of interest being the natural action. Their motivation is a manager's report of firm earnings given private information on both true earnings (analogous to our natural action) and her own objectives (analogous to our gaming ability). Among other things, Fischer and Verrecchia show how "price efficiency"-the information on true earnings contained in reported earnings-changes with parameters. For reasons explained in Section IV, we use elliptical distributions with bounded support rather than normal distributions. The linear-quadratic-normal and linear-quadratic-elliptical specifications are appealing in their tractability. In particular, they yield a scalar measure of information that one can combine with explicit equilibrium computation to deduce comparative statics. However, owing to the limitations of functional-form assumptions and algebraic calculations, we believe that a proper understanding of the underlying forces requires a more general analysis based on more fundamental assumptions. We aspire in Sections II and III of the current paper to elucidate these more general forces.
We should note that there are arguments for incomplete revelation of information even when agents have one-dimensional types satisfying single crossing. Separation may be precluded if there are bounds on the signal space, in which case there can be bunching at the edges of the type space (Cho and Sobel 1990) . However, this does not seem relevant for ap-4 Early work on signaling with multidimensional types (Quinzii and Rochet 1985; Engers 1987) established the existence of fully separating equilibria under suitable "global ordering" or single-crossing assumptions. As already noted, our model satisfies single crossing within each dimension but not globally. See Araujo, Gottlieb, and Moreira (2007) for a multidimensional-type model in which it is effectively as though single crossing fails even within a single dimension, which leads to "countersignaling" equilibria. Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To (2002) make a related point in a model with a single-dimensional type.
plications such as school testing or credit scores in which few people have perfect scores.
5 Indeed, if bunching at the edges is ever a problem, it may be possible to simply expand the signal space: a test can be made more difficult. On the other hand, there are critiques of the focus on separating equilibria even when these exist (Mailath, Fujiwara-Okuno, and Postlewaite 1993) ; recently, Daley and Green (2014) noted that separating equilibria need not be strategically stable when the market exogenously receives sufficiently precise information about the agents. Another reason why the market may not be able to perfectly infer the agent's type is that the signaling technology may be inherently noisy (Matthews and Mirman 1983) , although this can again be a choice object (Rick 2013) .
II. Model
We study a reduced-form signaling game. An agent takes an observable action; we will sometimes refer to "agents" for expositional convenience. The agent has two-dimensional private information-her type-that determines her cost of taking a single-dimensional action. The agent chooses an action and then receives a benefit that depends on an observer's belief about her type.
A. Types and Signaling Costs
The agent takes an action, a ∈ A ; R. The agent's type, her private information, is v 5 ðh, gÞ, drawn from a cumulative distribution F with compact support V ⊂ R Â R 11 . We write V h and V g for the projections of V onto dimensions h and g, respectively. The first dimension of the agent's type, h, which we call her natural action, represents the agent's intrinsic ideal point, or the highest action that she can take at minimum cost. 6 The second dimension, g, which we call gaming ability, parameterizes the agent's cost of increasing her action above the natural level: a higher g will represent lower cost. (It will be helpful to remember the mnemonics v for type, h for natural, and g for gaming.) The cost for an agent of type v 5 ðh, gÞ of taking action a is given by C(a, h, g), also written as C(a, v). Using subscripts on functions to denote partial derivatives in the usual manner, we make the following assumption on signaling costs. 5 In 2018, the 99th percentile score on the SAT was 1500 out of 1600 (College Board 2018) . In 2014, only about 1 percent of the US population had a perfect FICO credit score of 850; less than 20 percent of people had a score between 800 and 850 (Andriotis 2015) . 6 We will abuse notation by using the same symbols to denote both dimensions and realizations.
Assumption 1. The cost function C : R Â R Â R 11 → R is differentiable, twice-differentiable except possibly when a 5 h, and satisfies the following:
1. For all g and a ≤ h, Cða, h, gÞ 5 0. 2. For all g and a > h, C aa ða, h, gÞ > 0. 3. For all g and a > h, C ah ða, h, gÞ < 0 and C ag ða, h, gÞ < 0. 4. For any h < h and g < g, C a ðÁ, h, gÞ=C a ðÁ, h, gÞ is strictly increasing on ½ h, ∞Þ and there exists a or > h such that C a ða or , h, gÞ 5 C a ða or , h, gÞ.
Together, parts 1 and 2 of assumption 1 say that (i) the natural action a 5 h is an agent's highest cost-minimizing action, with cost normalized to zero; (ii) the agent can costlessly take actions below her natural action (free downward deviations); (iii) the marginal cost of increasing her action is zero at her natural action; and (iv) the agent incurs an increasing and convex cost to take actions above this level. Part 3 of the assumption stipulates that the marginal cost of increasing one's action is lower for agents with either higher natural actions or higher gaming ability. Consequently, C(⋅) satisfies decreasing differences (and hence a single-crossing property) among ordered types: if a < a and v < v in the componentwise order, then Cð a, vÞ 2 Cða, vÞ ≥ Cð a, vÞ 2 Cða, vÞ, with a strict inequality as long as a is strictly larger than v's natural action.
The fourth part of assumption 1 places structure on how C(⋅) behaves for pairs of cross types, where one type, ( h, g), has a strictly higher natural action but a strictly lower gaming ability than the other, (h, g). At low actions, the type with the higher h (and lower g) has a lower marginal cost of increasing its action. But this type's marginal cost grows faster than the other type's. There is some cutoff action, a or , at which the marginal-cost ordering of the two types reverses: at higher actions the type with the higher g (and lower h) now has a lower marginal cost of increasing its action. We refer to the action a or as the order-reversing action for the given pair. Assumption 1 implies the existence of another cutoff action, one at which the cross types share an equal signaling cost. We denote this action by a ce and refer to it as the cost-equalizing action. For any action below a ce , the type with lower g (but higher h) bears a lower cost, whereas the relationship is reversed for actions above a ce . Lemma 1. For any h < h and g < g, there exists a ce > a or such that Cða ce , h, gÞ 5 Cða ce , h, gÞ. Furthermore, for any a > h, sgn½Cða, h, gÞ 2 Cða, h, gÞ 5 sgn½a ce 2 a. (All proofs are in the online appendixes unless otherwise noted.) Figure 1 summarizes the implications of assumption 1 when V consists of four types: a low type, (h, g); two intermediate cross types, (h, g) and ( h, g); and a high type, ( h, g). Section II.C elaborates on the economics of the assumption. muddled informationExample 1. A canonical functional form is Cða, h, gÞ 5 cða, hÞ=g. In this case the first three parts of assumption 1 reduce to requiring the analogous properties on c(a, h), with the second requirement of part 3 automatically ensured. Since C a ða, h, gÞ C a ða, h, gÞ 5 c a ða, hÞ c a ða, hÞ g g , a sufficient condition for part 4 is that for any h < h, c a ðÁ, hÞ=c a ðÁ, hÞ is strictly increasing on the relevant domain with lim a → ∞ c a ða, hÞ=c a ða, hÞ 5 1. In particular, given any exponent r > 1, the cost function Cða, h, gÞ 5 ðmaxfa 2 h, 0gÞ r =g satisfies assumption 1. This family will be our leading example.
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B. Beliefs, Payoffs, and Equilibrium
There is one dimension of interest about the agent's type, t ∈ fh, gg. After observing the agent's action, an observer or "market" forms a posterior 
where k 5 1=ðr 2 1Þ and l 5 1=r . belief b t ∈ DðV t Þ over the dimension of interest, where D(X ) is the set of probability distributions on a (measurable) set X. The market evaluates the agent by the expected value of her type on dimension t, which we denotet : that is,t ; E bt ½t. We refer tot as the market belief about the agent. Gross of costs, the value or benefit from signaling for an agent who induces belieft is denoted V ðt; sÞ, where s ∈ R 11 parameterizes the signaling stakes. This benefit is independent of an agent's type. We maintain the following assumption about the benefit function.
Assumption 2. The benefit function, V ðt; sÞ, is continuous and satisfies the following:
1. For any s, V(⋅; s) is strictly increasing. 2. V(⋅) has strictly increasing differences: for anyt 0 >t, V ðt 0 ; ÁÞ 2 V ðt; ÁÞ is strictly increasing. 3. For anyt 0 >t, V ðt 0 ; sÞ 2 V ðt; sÞ → ∞ as s → ∞ and V ðt 0 ; sÞ 2 V ðt; sÞ → 0 as s → 0.
In other words, the agent prefers higher market beliefs, and higher beliefs are more valuable when stakes are higher. The benefit of inducing any higher belief grows unboundedly as stakes grow unboundedly, and analogously as stakes vanish. An example that we will refer to is V ðt; sÞ 5 svðtÞ for some strictly increasing v(⋅). Note that higher stakes do not represent greater direct benefits from taking higher actions; rather, they capture greater rewards to inducing higher market beliefs.
Combining the benefits and costs of signaling, an agent of type v 5 ðh, gÞ who plays action a yielding beliefst on dimension t has net (von Neumann-Morgenstern) payoff V ðt; sÞ 2 Cða, vÞ. This payoff function together with the prior distribution of types, F, induces a signaling game in the obvious way. We focus on (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibria-simply equilibria, hereafter-of this signaling game: every type of the agent chooses its action optimally given the market-belief functiontðaÞ, and the market belief is derived from Bayes's rule on the equilibrium path (with no restrictions off path). Given that the agent cares about the market belief on only one dimension of her type, equilibria cannot generally fully reveal both dimensions (cf. Stamland 1999) . We say that an equilibrium is separating if it fully reveals the agent's private information on the dimension of interest, an equilibrium is pooling if it reveals no information on the dimension of interest, and an equilibrium is partially pooling if it is neither separating nor pooling. We say that two equilibria are equivalent if they share the same mapping from types to (distributions over) the posterior belief, b t , and the same mapping from types to (distributions over) signaling costs.
The assumption of free downward deviations implies that equilibrium beliefs must be monotone over on-path actions. More precisely, following the convention that sup ∅ 5 2∞, the following holds:
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, if a 0 < a 00 are both on-path actions, then tða 0 Þ ≤tða 00 Þ. Moreover, for any equilibrium, there is an equivalent equilibrium in which (i) if a 0 < a 00 are both on-path actions, thentða 0 Þ <tða 00 Þ; and (ii) if a is an off-path action, then tðaÞ 5 max min V t , suptða 0 Þ : a 0 is on path and a 0 < a f g f g :
The first statement of the lemma is straightforward. Part i of the second statement follows from the observation that if there are two on-path actions a 0 < a 00 withtða 0 Þ 5tða 00 Þ, then one can shift any type's use of a 00 to a 0 without altering either the market belief at a 0 or any incentives. We will refer to this property as belief monotonicity, and without loss of generality, we restrict attention to equilibria that satisfy it. Part ii assures that there would be no loss in also requiring weak monotonicity of beliefs off the equilibrium path.
Remark 1. By free downward deviations, there is always a pooling equilibrium in which all types play a 5 min V h .
Remark 2. If the agent has private information only on the dimension of interest, with the component of her type on the other dimension known to the market, then there is a separating equilibrium. More generally, if there are no cross types in V, then there is a separating equilibrium due to the single-crossing property.
C. Discussion of the Model
Assumptions
Two of our assumptions warrant additional discussion. The first is free downward deviations (part 1 of assumption 1): an agent can costlessly take any action below her natural action. As noted above, free downward deviations ensure that equilibrium beliefs are monotonic in actions and that a pooling equilibrium always exists. These two properties are common features of signaling games. The fact that free downward deviations guarantee the properties simplifies our analysis. In making the assumption, though, we are primarily motivated by applications. It is much easier to make web pages appear to be of lower than higher quality; it is obvious how to wreck one's credit score but not how to raise it; and it is virtually costless to get questions wrong on a test, whereas getting more questions right is difficult.
Notwithstanding, in some settings there may be a direct cost of deviating downward. An accountant manipulating financial reports, as in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), cannot easily make them look worse than they truly are; lowering one's credit score by failing to pay a bill on time may incur monetary costs; or, as in Kartik (2009) , agents may dislike lying regardless of the direction in which they lie. 8 The mechanism explored in our paper does not turn on the assumption of free downward deviations. Indeed, take any equilibrium strategy in which each type's action is weakly above her natural action. There would be an equilibrium with this strategy even with costly downward deviations; unplayed lower actions would now be even less attractive. Section IV studies a specification of the model and a class of equilibria in which actions are in fact never below natural actions. Hence, the results therein would be unchanged if downward deviations were made costly.
The second assumption to highlight, our key assumption, is part 4 of assumption 1: for any pair of cross types, the ratio of marginal costs of the high natural action type to the high gaming ability type is increasing in the action. The interpretation is that as more gaming occurs-that is, as agents choose higher actions-cost differences become less driven by variation in natural actions, and more by variation in gaming ability. In the credit-scoring example, suppose Anne has a natural credit score of 675 and low gaming ability, while Bob has a lower natural score, 600, but a higher gaming ability. If both agents aim for a credit score around 700, Anne's marginal cost of score improvement is lower than Bob's: Anne can address the most obvious flaws on her credit history while Bob has already made a lot of changes from his natural behavior. At higher scores around 800, though, Bob's marginal cost of improvement is lower than Anne's: both Anne and Bob must engage in a lot of gaming to reach this level, and Bob is the one who knows more about how to game or is better at it.
In many settings, over the relevant range of actions, we think our key assumption is likely to be valid. On the other hand, one can conceive of violations. For instance, no matter the amount of studying (gaming), only those with sufficiently high natural ability (natural actions) might be able to attain the highest scores on an IQ test. It turns out, however, that the assumption is crucial for the comparative statics on how market information responds to changes in stakes. Indeed, we view one of our main contributions as identifying the role and importance of such an assumption. In the conclusion of the paper we discuss how our analysis helps shed light on situations in which the assumption may not be satisfied.
Applications
Our analysis considers either the natural action or the gaming ability as the possible dimension of interest.
Natural action as the dimension of interest.-The main applications we are motivated by are school tests, web searching, and credit scores. Heterogeneity of natural actions reflects that agents would take different actions absent signaling concerns. Students get different SAT scores prior to studying; websites are more or less relevant for a given query; and even without a formal credit score, consumers differ in their propensity to pay bills on time. This natural action is of direct interest to the colleges admitting students, people searching the web, and banks offering loans.
There are a number of (nonexclusive) sources for heterogeneity in gaming ability in these applications. One is underlying skills: some students may simply be more facile at studying. Another is that agents could have heterogeneous understanding of how to game a signal due to differing experience or information. Some students may have access to tutors with better practice materials; professional web designers are more attuned than amateurs to search engine optimization techniques; and some consumers do not know strategies to improve one's credit score, as evidenced by the large genre of books on the subject.
Agents may also have different preferences for gaming: students vary in how much they enjoy or dislike studying. Those who enjoy it more face a lower cost of increasing their test scores. When gaming involves monetary costs, we can also interpret those with access to more money as having a lower disutility of spending money relative to the signaling benefits. In particular, the College Board worries that richer students can better afford private tutoring and test prep courses for its SAT test (College Board 2014).
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When there are unethical approaches to gaming, differences in "integrity" could affect agents' preferences toward gaming. In addition to studying for exams, students can find ways to cheat. Websites can engage in undesirable behaviors such as "web spam" or "black hat SEO" to improve their search rankings. Colleges can and sometimes do engage in dubious activities to affect their U.S. News & World Report rankings (e.g., Rimer 2008) .
One can also interpret an agent's gaming ability as parameterizing her private benefits: if Cða, h, gÞ 5 cða, hÞ=g, then the net payoff function V ðt; sÞ 2 cða, hÞ=g represents the same preferences as the payoff function gV ðt; sÞ 2 cða, hÞ. Intuitively, it is indistinguishable whether rich students have a lower cost of paying for coaching relative to their benefit from higher scores, or whether these students have a higher benefit (in dollar terms) relative to the monetary cost of such coaching. Alterna-tively, some website owners are more interested in attracting hits than others. In related applications, managers value the market's evaluation of their firm's earnings differently (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000) , and individuals vary in how much they care about their social image (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) .
Gaming ability as the dimension of interest.-There are contexts in which what we refer to as the gaming ability would be the dimension of interest. Indeed, Spence's (1973) framework of job-market signaling is precisely one in which the market values "gaming" ability, because the ability to "game" by completing undesirable schooling at lower cost is positively correlated with productivity. While the simplest version of Spence (1973) has a homogeneous natural action of acquiring no education, there may in fact be underlying preference variation over education that is irrelevant to employers. Similarly, preexisting variation in SAT scores might arise from differences in socioeconomic status or high-school quality while "gaming" ability correlates with a broader ability to study and learn new skills. (Colleges or employers could value a mix of both dimensions; see Sec. IV.C.)
Other applications for gaming ability as the dimension of interest emerge when gaming ability is reinterpreted as private benefits, as discussed above. For instance, better students may tend to have a stronger preference to attend better colleges, expecting to get more out of the experience. Colleges would then prefer to admit those students with higher private benefits. Esteban and Ray (2006) make a related point in the context of signaling quality for license procurement.
D. Measuring Information and Welfare
The natural measure for agent welfare is the expected payoff across types, E½V ðt; sÞ 2 Cða, vÞ. We say that allocative efficiency is the expected benefit from signaling gross of signaling costs: E½V ðt; sÞ. Besides these standard quantities, our focus in this paper will be on the amount of information revealed about the dimension of interest of the agent's type, t.
Recall that b t ∈ DðV t Þ is the market posterior (the marginal distribution) over the dimension of interest, t. From the ex ante point of view, any equilibrium induces a probability distribution over b t , which is an element of D(D(V t )). In any equilibrium, the expectation over b t must be the prior distribution over t. Equilibria may differ, however, in the distribution they induce over b t . A separating equilibrium is fully informative about t : after any on-path action, b t will be degenerate. A pooling equilibrium is uninformative about t: after any on-path action, b t is simply the prior over t. To compare informativeness of equilibria in between these two extremes, we will use the canonical partial ordering of Blackwell (1951 Blackwell ( , 1953 . We say that a distribution of beliefs or posteriors is more informative than another if the former is a mean-preserving spread of the latter. 10 An equilibrium e 0 is more informative about t than an equilibrium e 00 if the distribution of b t under e 0 is more informative than that under e 00 . As the agent's signaling benefit depends only on the market's posterior mean on the dimension of interest,t, we will also be interested in information specifically aboutt rather than about the entire distribution b t . An equilibrium e 0 is more informative aboutt than e 00 if the distribution oft under e 0 is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution under e 00 . 11 An equilibrium is uninformative aboutt if the distribution it induces overt is a point mass at the prior mean of t ; it is fully informative aboutt if every on-path action reveals the agent's true type on the dimension of interest. Note that an equilibrium can be uninformative aboutt even if the equilibrium is informative about t. On the other hand, an equilibrium is fully informative aboutt if and only if it is fully informative about t. In general, the partial order on equilibria generated by information aboutt is finer than that generated by information about t: more informative about t implies more informative aboutt, but more informative aboutt does not necessarily imply more informative about t.
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Comparing equilibria according to their informativeness is appealing because of the fundamental connection between this statistical notion and allocative efficiency E½V ðt; sÞ. If the benefit function V(⋅; s) is convex, then for fixed stakes there is higher allocative efficiency when the beliefs aboutt are more informative (and hence also when the beliefs about t are more informative). If V(⋅; s) is concave, the opposite holds: allocative efficiency is maximized by pooling all types and leaving the market belief at the prior. For a linear V(⋅; s), allocative efficiency is independent of the information aboutt.
We are primarily motivated by situations in which information has an allocative benefit, corresponding to a weakly convex benefit function. Consider, for instance, a market in which consumers (agents) bring differing service costs to a firm that provides them a product. Revealing information about consumer costs means that higher cost consumers will be offered higher prices. This information transfers surplus from highcost to low-cost consumers but also improves the efficiency of the allocation. Appendix A provides an explicit example relating the demand curve for a product to the shape of a convex benefit function. 10 Throughout this paper, we use the terminological convention that binary comparisons are always in the weak sense (e.g., "more informative" means "at least as informative as") unless explicitly indicated otherwise.
11 Our notion of informativeness aboutt is the same as Ganuza and Penalva's (2010) integral precision. Informativeness aboutt is prior dependent, unlike informativeness about t.
12 If V t is binary, then the posterior meant is a sufficient statistic for the posterior distribution bt. In this case, more informative aboutt does imply more informative about t, and uninformative aboutt implies uninformative about t. journal of political economy
III. Effect of Stakes on Muddled Information
A. 2 Â 2 Setting
This section considers a 2 Â 2 setting: V ⊆fh, hg Â fg, gg, with h < h and g < g. We will be able to establish global comparative statics here on the informativeness of equilibria with respect to the stakes.
First, to develop intuition, consider a special case in which the prior's support is the two cross types, (h, g) and ( h, g). Call ( h, g) "the natural type," as it has the higher natural action, and (h, g) "the gamer." With only these cross types, the following observation suggests why information about the natural action decreases with stakes while information about the gaming ability increases.
Observation 1. When V 5 fðh, gÞ, ð h, gÞg, the following hold: The logic driving the observation is worth going through. First suppose the dimension of interest is the natural action (t 5 h), so that both types want to be thought of as the natural type. If stakes are low, one separating equilibrium has both types playing their natural actions, at zero cost. The natural type obviously prefers not to deviate downward even though it could do so for free, and the gamer is unwilling to bear the cost of mimicking the natural type. On the other hand, there cannot be a separating equilibrium when stakes are high. The gamer would be willing to take any action below the cost-equalizing action, a ce , to be thought of as the natural type, and the natural type cannot separate by taking an action above a ce , as any such action would be less costly for the gamer. When the dimension of interest is the gaming ability (t 5 g), both types want to be thought of as the gamer. Separation now requires high stakes, as the gamer cannot separate by taking an action below a ce . At high enough stakes, there will be an a > a ce such that only the gamer would be willing to take a in order to be thought of as the gamer. On the other hand, at low enough stakes, the gamer would not be willing to take any action above h; by free downward deviations, the natural type can costlessly mimic the gamer, and hence only pooling equilibria exist.
In addition to separating and pooling equilibria, there can be partially pooling equilibria. One-but not necessarily the only-form of partial pooling is as follows. Pick any action a 1 ∈ ½h, a or Þ, where a or is the orderreversing action. There is a corresponding action a 2 ∈ ða or , a ce such that the gamer and the natural type bear the same incremental cost of moving from a 1 to a 2 . At high enough stakes, regardless of the dimension of interest, there is a partially pooling equilibrium in which both types mix over these two actions.
14 The two types can both be indifferent because they pay the same additional cost and receive the same additional signaling benefit when increasing their action from a 1 to a 2 . If the dimension of interest is the natural action, these equilibria are the only informative ones at high enough stakes. But they become uninformative as stakes go to infinity: the belief at the lower action a 1 must converge to the belief at the higher action a 2 in order for the signaling benefit of increasing from a 1 to a 2 to remain constant (equal to the unchanging cost difference).
So, with only cross types, as summed up in observation 1, when t 5 h the market can get full information at low stakes but approximately no information at high stakes. When t 5 g, there is no information at low stakes but there can be full information at high stakes.
Armed with this intuition, let us turn to global comparative statics. We seek to show that information decreases in stakes when t 5 h and increases in stakes when t 5 g, not just for the case of two cross types but for the more general 2 Â 2 setting. For any given stakes, there are typically multiple equilibria; these equilibria need not all be ranked by their (Blackwell) informativeness. We use the weak set order to compare equilibrium sets: equilibrium set Q is more informative about t than equilibrium set Q 0 , and Q 0 is less informative about t than Q, if (i) for any equilibrium e ∈ Q 0 there exists e 0 ∈ Q 0 with e more informative about t than e 0 , and (ii) for any e 0 ∈ Q 0 there exists e ∈ Q with e more informative about t than e 0 . Condition i is satisfied whenever the comparison is between all equilibria at different parameters, simply by taking e 0 ∈ Q 0 to be a pooling equilibrium (which always exists, as was noted in remark 1). So it is only condition ii that has bite when comparing sets of equilibria across 14 When both types mix in this fashion, no action in (a 1 , a 2 ) can be taken; however, there may be on-path actions above a2 or below a1. By assumption 1, part 4, the gamer has a lower incremental cost than the natural type of moving to actions above a 2 , and also a larger cost reduction of moving to actions below a 1 . So any actions besides a 1 and a 2 can only be taken by the gamer. Since beliefs must be monotonic on path, the gamer can take an action below a1 when t 5 h and above a2 when t 5 g. When t 5 h, however, at sufficiently high stakes the gamer would no longer be willing to reveal itself by taking an action below a 1 .
parameters: for any equilibrium in the less informative set, there is an equilibrium in the more informative set that is more informative.
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The following proposition is the main result of this subsection. Proposition 1. In the 2 Â 2 setting, consider stakes s < s.
1. When t 5 h, the set of equilibria under s is more informative about h than the set of equilibria under s. 2. When t 5 g, the set of equilibria under s is less informative about g than the set of equilibria under s.
To prove proposition 1, we first fix a dimension of interest, a level of stakes, and an arbitrary equilibrium. We then look at nearby equilibria as we perturb the stakes. We construct a path of new equilibria in which the belief distribution (continuously) becomes more informative as stakes move in the appropriate direction: lower stakes when t 5 h and higher stakes when t 5 g. Formally:
Lemma 3. In the 2 Â 2 setting, let Q(s) be the set of equilibria at stakes s > 0, and fix some equilibrium e 0 at stakes s 0 > 0. Lemma 3 implies proposition 1. The lemma's proof is involved because, even in this 2 Â 2 setting, an equilibrium can have many different combinations of binding incentive constraints. We provide a sketch of the proof in Appendix C. The proof confirms that, starting at any such combination, a suitable perturbed equilibrium can be found as the stakes go up (when t 5 g) or down (when t 5 h). The same basic logic applies in some form for each case: to increase information about t as the stakes vary, we shift mixing probabilities of high-t types from low actions with low beliefs to high actions with high beliefs, and/or shift mix-15 There may exist no "most informative" equilibrium in an equilibrium set. If we were to extend the Blackwell (1951) partial ordering to a complete ordering, then our notion of equilibrium set Q being more informative than equilibrium set Q 0 (which contains a pooling equilibrium) would correspond to the most informative element of Q being more informative than that of Q 0 . 16 That is, for a sequence s → s*, the corresponding distributions under s converge weakly to that under s * .
When
ing probabilities of low-t types from high actions to low actions. The main cases begin from an equilibrium akin to the partially pooling ones discussed in the context of observation 1: the two cross types are both indifferent between the same pair of on-path actions a 1 ∈ ½h, a or Þ and a 2 ∈ ða or , a ce . The low type, (h, g), takes an action no larger than a 1 . The high type, ( h, g), takes an action no smaller than a 2 . Although proposition 1 is stated for the entire set of equilibria, we conjecture that its conclusion would also hold were attention restricted to equilibria satisfying stability-based refinements such as D1 or divinity (Banks and Sobel 1987; Cho and Kreps 1987) .
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B. General Type Spaces
For more general type spaces, V ⊂ R Â R 11 , we are unable to get global comparative statics on information as stakes vary. Instead, to extend the theme that observers tend to be more informed about the natural action at low stakes and more informed about gaming ability at high stakes, we generalize observation 1. As stakes become arbitrarily small or large, we provide results on the existence of separating equilibria, as well as conditions guaranteeing that equilibria become approximately uninformative aboutt. Formally, we say that at high (respectively, low) stakes, equilibria are approximately uninformative aboutt if for any sequence of equilibria e s at stakes s > 0, it holds that as s → ∞ (respectively, s → 0), the distribution oft under e s weakly converges to the uninformative distribution, a point mass at E[t].
First consider the natural action as the dimension of interest. Proposition 2. Assume t 5 h.
1. If jV h j < ∞, then at low stakes there is a fully informative equilibrium about h. 2. If V has any cross types, then at high stakes there is no fully informative equilibrium about h. 3. If the marginal distribution of g is continuous and if E½hjg is nonincreasing in g, then at high stakes equilibria are approximately uninformative aboutĥ.
(Owing to their centrality, the proofs of proposition 2 and proposition 3 are in app. D rather than the online appendixes.)
Parts 1 and 2 of proposition 2 are relatively straightforward given our discussion in the 2 Â 2 setting. Regarding part 2, recall that if there were no cross types, then standard arguments based on the single-crossing 17 Bagwell (2007) property imply that a separating equilibrium would exist at any level of stakes.
Part 3 of proposition 2 is a consequence of lemma 4 in appendix D, which states that for any pair of cross types, as stakes get large, the type with higher gaming ability must induce a belief not much lower, and possibly strictly higher, than any belief induced by the other type. In the limit as s → ∞, any type with strictly higher gaming ability than another type induces a weakly higher belief about its natural action. This monotonicity of beliefs in the limit provides an upper bound on how informative an equilibrium can be about natural actions at very large stakes: any limiting distribution of beliefs on h must be "ironed" so that the set of g types consistent with a beliefĥ is weakly increasing inĥ (in the sense of the strong set order). Under the hypotheses of part 3 of proposition 2, any limiting distribution is necessarily uninformative about the posterior meanĥ.
Two observations help explain the hypotheses in part 3 of proposition 2. First, if the distribution of g were not continuous, then a mass of types with the lowest g and a low h (or the highest g and a high h) might separate from other types even in the limit as s → ∞, revealing information about their h. Second, even with a continuous distribution of g, if the expectation E½hjg were strictly increasing in g-for example, because of positive correlation between h and g-then types with higher g might be able to signal their higher average h by taking higher actions.
We turn to gaming ability as the dimension of interest: Proposition 3. Assume t 5 g.
1.
If jV g j < ∞, then at high stakes there is a fully informative equilibrium about g. 2. If V has any cross types, then at low stakes there is no fully informative equilibrium about g.
If the marginal distribution of h is continuous and if E½gjh is non-
increasing in h, then at low stakes equilibria are approximately uninformative aboutĝ.
The logic is more or less a mirror image of that of proposition 2, with lemma 5 in appendix D playing an analogous role to lemma 4.
IV. Linear-Quadratic-Elliptical Specification
This section studies a specification of our general framework that permits an explicit equilibrium characterization and additional comparative statics. We specialize to a linear benefit V ðt; sÞ 5 st and a quadratic cost Cða, h, gÞ 5 ðmaxfa 2 h, 0gÞ 2 =ð2gÞ. Given stakes s > 0, the agent's payoff is thus
Furthermore, the agent's type v 5 ðh, gÞ is drawn from an elliptical distribution: a distribution in which there is a constant probability density on each concentric ellipse about a mean. We refer to this specification of preferences and type distribution as the linear-quadratic-elliptical, or LQE, specification. Formally, an (absolutely continuous) elliptical distribution E(m, Σ, g) over a two-dimensional realization x 5 ðx 1 , x 2 Þ is defined by m 5 ðm 1 , m 2 Þ ∈ R 2 , o 5 j 2 1 j 12 j 12 j 2 2 a positive definite matrix, and g ðÁÞ : R 1 → R 1 a measurable function called the density generator. The probability density of this distribution is f ðxÞ 5 kjΣj 21=2 g ððx 2 mÞΣ 21 ðx 2 mÞ 0 Þ, with k 5 1=½p Ð g ðtÞdt ∈ R 11 a constant of integration. 18 We take v to be drawn from with j h > 0, j g > 0, and r ∈ ð21, 1Þ. Our maintained assumption of a compact support corresponds to a requirement that g v has compact support. Without loss, let the support of g v be contained in [0, 1]; then for i ∈ fh, gg, the support of the marginal distribution of i is [m i 2 j i , m i 1 j i ]. In order to guarantee our maintained assumption that g > 0 for all types, assume m g > j g .
In an elliptical distribution with a given density generator g, the marginal distribution of component i 5 1, 2 depends only on m i and j i . (See Gómez, Gómez-Villegas, and Marín [2003] for an accessible introduction to this and other properties of elliptical distributions.) The vector of means is m. The covariance matrix is aΣ for some constant a > 0 that depends only on g. The correlation coefficient between the two components is therefore j 12 =ðj 1 j 2 Þ. The coefficient of determination in a linear regression of one component on the other, which is commonly referred to as the R 2 , is equal to the square of this correlation coefficient:
Þ. Elliptical distributions are a generalization of joint normal distributions. Normality corresponds to the density generator g ðtÞ 5 expfð21=2Þtg. We cannot use normal distributions (and have ruled them out by requiring g v 18 We assume g(⋅) is Lebesgue integrable with Ð g ðtÞdt ∈ R 11 . The notation FΣF refers to the determinant of Σ and ðx 2 mÞ 0 refers to the transpose of (x 2 m). Vectors x and m are row vectors prior to transposition.
to have compact support) because they would entail types with g < 0; an agent with g < 0 and the objective given in expression (1) would obtain direct benefits rather than incurring costs from taking higher actions. A simple example of an elliptical distribution with compact support is a uniform distribution over the interior of an ellipse, which corresponds to g ðtÞ 5 z1 ft≤1g . Elliptical distributions preserve many useful properties of joint normal distributions. Crucially, when (h, g) is elliptically distributed and the action a is any linear function of h and g, it holds that E½tja is a linear function of a. So a linear strategy in the agent's type will imply a linear market belief. (Quadratic costs and linear benefits will ensure that a linear strategy is optimal given a linear market belief.)
Our analysis in this section is related to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , Bénabou and Tirole (2006, sec. II.B) , and Gesche (2017). Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) have previously studied related specifications to what we use; they take their type distribution to be bivariate independent normal and focus on the dimension of interest being (their analog of) t 5 h. 19 Bénabou and Tirole study equilibrium actions. We emphasize comparative statics of equilibrium informativeness, which were studied in Fischer and Verrecchia's corollary 3, and which play a role in Ali and Bénabou (2016) . Our analysis adds broader dimensions of interest (allowing for t 5 g and even a mixture) as well as correlation of types. Permitting correlation is important for our applications. For example, types are correlated when students from a higher socioeconomic class can more easily pay for effective test preparation (higher g) and also tend to be better prepared for college (higher h). We owe the idea of using elliptical distributions to Gesche (2017) ; his equilibrium characterization is related to ours for the case of t 5 h, but he makes somewhat different assumptions than we do and he does not focus on market information.
Consistent with the common practice in models with normal distributions, we will focus on linear equilibria in our LQE specification: equilibria in which an agent of type (h, g) takes action a 5 l h h 1 l g g 1 b, for some constants l h , l g , and b. In any such equilibrium, the market belief,tðaÞ, is a linear function of the agent's action. 20 Moreover, (i) the vector (t, a) is 19 Recall from Sec. II.C that g can be reinterpreted as parameterizing private benefits rather than gaming ability. Specifically, when g > 0, the objective given in eq. (1) is equivalent to sgt 2 ðmaxfa 2 h, 0gÞ 2 =2. This latter objective is still meaningful when some agents have g < 0, under the interpretation that some agents prefer lower market beliefs to higher. If the cost function is then modified from ðmaxfa 2 h, 0gÞ 2 =2 to ða 2 hÞ 2 =2, i.e., to let downward deviations from the natural action be symmetrically costly to upward deviations, one recovers the objective function analyzed by Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) , Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , and Gesche (2017) . In that specification, agents with g < 0 will take actions below their ideal point h at a positive cost in order to reduce the market belief.
20 Strictly speaking, the market belief is only pinned down at on-path actions. It is without loss for our purposes to stipulate a globally linear market belief.
elliptically distributed with the same density generator g v as (h, g), and (ii) the ex ante distribution of posteriors b t about t given a is determined entirely by R 2 ta , the R 2 between t and a. Fixing g v and fixing the prior distribution of t, a higher R 2 ta implies an equilibrium that is more informative about the market belieft. An R 2 ta of 1 implies a fully informative equilibrium aboutt (and hence also about t). An R 2 ta of 0 is uninformative aboutt.
21 See lemma 6 and lemma 8 in appendix SA.3 for details (apps. SA.1-SA.4 available as an online supplement).
We begin by characterizing linear equilibria. As in our general analysis earlier, free downward deviations ensure that any equilibrium must have a market posteriortðÁÞ that is nondecreasing on the equilibrium path, and that there is a pooling equilibrium in whichtðÁÞ is constant. Thus, a linear equilibrium is informative aboutt if and only if the market belief is increasing in the agent's action. An increasing linear equilibrium haŝ
for some L > 0. Given a market belief of the form of equation (2), the agent's optimal action is unique:
When the agent plays a linear strategy, the market's posterior beliefs will be elliptically distributed with mean linear in the agent's action. Increasing linear equilibria are determined by solving for a fixed point: values of L > 0 and K under which the market's induced beliefs have mean equal to that hypothesized. While we relegate the details to lemma 9 in appendix SA.3, it is useful to note that an equilibrium value of L > 0 is determined as
where :t refers to the dimension other than the dimension of interest (e.g., :t 5 g when t 5 h), and Lðs,L, hÞ ; 1 and Lðs,L, gÞ ; sL. By equation (2), the equilibrium constant L measures the responsiveness of the market belieft to the agent's action. Remark 3. By equation (3), the agent takes an action above her natural action in any increasing linear equilibrium. Consequently, such equilibria are unaffected by relaxing free downward deviations: making it costly for the agent to take actions a < h (e.g., Cða, h, gÞ 5 2ða 2 hÞ 2 =ð2gÞ) would only make some deviations even less attractive. 21 An R 2 ta 5 0 implies that t and a are uncorrelated:t, the posterior mean conditional on a, is constant with respect to a. However, while the equilibrium is uninformative aboutt, it is still informative about t. The support of t depends on a, for instance. Indeed, when two random variables are jointly elliptically distributed, they can be independent only if the distribution is joint normal (Kelker 1970) .
Remark 4. Fixing a joint distribution over h and g with r ≥ 0, an equilibrium will be less informative aboutĥ and more informative about g when the coefficient sL in equation (3) is larger; see lemma 7 in appendix SA.3. Fixing the marginal distribution of t and varying r or j :t , though, sL is no longer a sufficient statistic for information. One will need to look at R 2 ta , with explicit formulas given in equations (SA.6) and (SA.7) in appendix SA.3.
A. Dimension of Interest Is the Natural Action
Assume t 5 h. As described above, informativeness aboutĥ is captured by the one-dimensional value R 2 ha ∈ ½0, 1. Proposition 4. In the LQE specification, assume t 5 h and r ≥ 0.
1. There is a unique increasing linear equilibrium. 2. In that equilibrium, (a) as
For the case of r 5 0, Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) have obtained similar conclusions to proposition 4 using their specification.
Part 1 of proposition 4 is self-explanatory. Part 2a says that as stakes vanish, the increasing linear equilibrium becomes fully informative aboutĥ; this result is a counterpart to part 1 of proposition 2. Part 2b says that as stakes grow unboundedly, the equilibrium becomes uninformative aboutĥ when r 5 0, which is consistent with part 3 of proposition 2. However, for any r > 0, there is some information revealed aboutĥ even in the limit of unbounded stakes; as explained after proposition 2, the intuition is that when E½hjg is increasing in g, higher g types can signal their higher average h by taking higher actions. The unbounded-stakes limit becomes fully informative as r → 1.
Part 3 of proposition 4 provides comparative statics for interior stakes. Part 3a confirms our fundamental theme that higher stakes reduce information about the natural action. The other parts address comparative statics that we have not touched on so far. Part 3b notes that the ex ante mean of the gaming ability has no effect on equilibrium informativeness aboutĥ; rather, changes in m g only shift the agent's action and the market belief function by a constant. Part 3c says that greater ex ante uncertainty about g reduces equilibrium information aboutĥ. Together, parts 3b and 3c underscore that loss of information about the natural action is not due to gaming per se, but rather heterogeneity in gaming ability. Finally, part 3d says that increasing an already nonnegative correlation between h and g leads to more equilibrium information aboutĥ. An intuition is that a greater nonnegative correlation reduces the amount of heterogeneity in g conditional on any h: for elliptical distributions, VarðgjhÞ 5 aj 2 g ð1 2 r 2 Þ. At the limit when r 5 1, the type space is effectively one-dimensional and the equilibrium fully reveals all private information.
Although proposition 4 is stated for r ≥ 0, the key points also extend to r < 0. The complication is that when r < 0 and stakes are intermediate, there can be multiple increasing linear equilibria. Nevertheless, the comparative statics in s, m g , and j h all generalize subject to the caveat of focusing on the appropriate equilibria.
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B. Dimension of Interest Is the Gaming Ability
Assume t 5 g. Informativeness aboutĝ is captured by R 2 ga . Proposition 5. In the LQE specification, assume t 5 g and r ≥ 0. 
Part 1 of proposition 5 says that an increasing linear equilibrium exists only when either r 5 0 and stakes are sufficiently large, or when r > 0. When r 5 0 (but not when r > 0), for any level of stakes there is an equilibrium in which the agent plays a 5 h: the agent takes her natural action at no cost, and the market learns nothing aboutĝ.
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To interpret part 2a of proposition 5, observe that as s → 0 the agent's play in an increasing linear equilibrium must converge to a 5 h; at the limit, the market learns h, which implies R 2 ga 5 R 2 gh 5 r 2 . Part 2b says that as stakes grow unboundedly, the equilibrium becomes fully informative aboutĝ; this is a counterpart to part 1 of proposition 3. Part 3a confirms our fundamental theme that even away from limiting stakes, higher stakes increase information about gaming ability. The remaining comparative statics in part 3 are analogous to those discussed in the context of proposition 4. 22 Two points bear clarification about r < 0. First, R 2 ha → 0 as s → ∞, as is consistent with the "ironing" logic discussed in the context of part 3 of proposition 2. Second, comparative statics on r are not clear-cut. 23 As r → 0 1 , the unique increasing linear equilibrium converges to the increasing linear equilibrium of r 5 0 if s > j 2 h =j 2 g , while it otherwise converges to the equilibrium in which the agent plays a 5 h. When r 5 0, the equilibrium in which a 5 h is uninformative about g, but it is not uninformative about g; see n. 21 above. Note that this equilibrium exists irrespective of free downward deviations. There also exists a fully uninformative equilibrium ( just as when t 5 h) supported using free downward deviations, in which the agent pools on a sufficiently low action independent of type.
C. Mixed Dimensions of Interest
The tractability of the LQE specification makes it possible to study a number of additional questions. Appendix SA.3.4 studies an extension in which the agent cares about the market's belief about both h and g. Specifically, we consider a signaling benefit s½kĝ 1 ð1 2 kÞĥ, where k ∈ ð0, 1Þ. We show that even with these mixed dimensions of interest, higher stakes reduce market information about the agent's natural action and increase market information about the agent's gaming ability.
V. Applications
A. Manipulability and Information Provision
Our main results are couched in terms of changes in the signaling stakes, which affect the benefits of signaling. Now let us add a parameter to the model that affects the costs of signaling: the manipulability of the signal, M > 0. Consider an agent's payoff function of the form
Higher manipulability scales down the signaling costs for all agent types. For an agent, this payoff function is isomorphic to MV ðt; sÞ 2 Cða, vÞ, with M satisfying all the conditions on s in assumption 2. Increasing manipulability thus has the same equilibrium effect as raising the stakes. When the dimension of interest is the natural action, it reduces market information; when the dimension of interest is the gaming ability, it increases information. In some cases manipulability is a property of the signaling technology. Google's PageRank algorithm for website ranking is considered harder (i.e., costlier) to game than earlier search engines that were based primarily on keyword density. Different types of tests might cover material that is easier or harder to study for; for instance, it is often thought to be harder to study for tests that measure "aptitude" rather than "achievement."
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Manipulability may also depend on agents' knowledge about the signaling technology. One aspect of this is familiarity or experience with the technology. A designer trying to increase market information about natural actions may benefit from altering a test format or by replacing a credit-scoring or search-engine-ranking algorithm with a new one. Even if the new signaling technology is inherently no less manipulable, agents may initially find it more difficult to game. A constant battle between de-signers and agents could result. Indeed, it is reported that Google tweaks its search algorithm as often as 600 times a year partly to mitigate undesirable search engine optimization (http://moz.com/google-algorithm -change).
Designers can also control how much information is given out about the workings of the signaling technology. Google keeps its precise algorithm secret, past SAT questions were kept hidden until the 1980s, and U.S. News & World Report sometimes changes its ranking algorithm with an explicit announcement that the algorithm will not be revealed until after the rankings are published (Morse 2010) . Our model gives a straightforward reason for such practices: a more opaque signaling technology may be less manipulable or more costly to game than a transparent one. When the dimension of interest is the natural action, less manipulable implies more informative. Weston (2011, 8-9) writes that prior to legislation requiring the Fair Isaac Corporation to reveal some details about its FICO algorithm, "The company said it worried that consumers . . . would try to 'game the system' if they knew more. Fair Isaac feared that its formulas would lose their predictive abilities if consumers started changing their behavior to boost their scores."
It is important to recognize, however, that revealing information about the workings of an algorithm need not scale down gaming costs uniformly across agents as posited in expression (5). If gaming costs were reduced differentially across types, then the impact on market information could be ambiguous. To make this point precise, recall the cost specification of Cða, vÞ 5 cða, hÞ=g, in which case expression (5) becomes V ðt; sÞ 2 cða, hÞ=ðM gÞ. Increasing M is now isomorphic to uniformly scaling up the gaming abilities of all agent types. But, as discussed earlier, knowledge of or experience with the signaling technology may be a source of heterogeneity on gaming ability. In that case, revealing information could effectively increase gaming ability more for the low-g types than the high-g ones. At the extreme, revealing all information about the algorithm could raise all gaming abilities to the same high level, eliminating heterogeneity on g. There would then be a separating equilibrium with full information on h. Away from the extreme, proposition 4 (part 3) for the LQE specification suggests a simple rule of thumb: the amount of information about h decreases with the variance of g, while it is independent of the mean of g. Any intervention lowering the variance of gaming ability should tend to improve market information about the natural action. So, if some people are better able to study for the SAT than others because they have greater access to past SAT questions, the College Board may prefer to reveal these questions to everyone.
Similarly, subsidizing direct monetary costs of gaming could effectively raise the gaming ability of all agents. This would seem to be a bad policy to increase information about natural actions. But if heterogeneity on gaming ability had been driven by wealth differences in the first place, then such a policy might increase gaming ability more for low-g types than high-g types, with the effect of increasing information about natural actions. This is our interpretation of the College Board's recent move to "level the playing field" between rich (high g) and poor (low g) students by producing and publicizing free test prep material (College Board 2014). The intervention does not just transfer surplus from rich to poor; it improves the information content of SAT scores.
B. Informational Externalities across Markets
Suppose a designer can choose whether or not to reveal agents' actions to different observers. The direct effect of revealing the actions to a new observer is that the new observer is more informed. With more observers, however, agents have stronger incentives to signal: signaling stakes increase. Our analysis therefore implies an indirect informational effect on preexisting observers. When the dimension of interest is the gaming ability, an agent's action becomes more informative, but when the dimension of interest is the natural action, the action becomes less informative. In this latter case, a designer must trade off the benefits of revealing the action to marginal observers with the negative informational externality imposed on inframarginal observers.
For concreteness, consider different markets in which credit reports are useful. Lenders use credit scores to determine how much credit to offer borrowers, and at what terms. Employers check credit reports during the hiring process to assess risks such as employee theft or general trustworthiness. Automobile-and homeowner-insurance companies now also commonly use information from credit reports to help determine insurance rates. In recent years, a number of states have considered or passed legislation restricting the use of credit history in insurance underwriting and in employment. Many of the arguments in favor of these laws are based on some notion of "fairness": it is not fair to deny someone employment based on their high credit card debt, or to raise their insurance rates because of missed mortgage payments.
We suggest a different concern. Making credit information available to markets such as insurance and employment could alter consumers' gaming behavior in a way that dilutes the information contained in credit scores, thereby harming efficiency in the loan market.
To formalize the argument, let the dimension of interest be the natural action, h, and let V ðĥ; sÞ 5 vðĥÞ 1 wðE½hÞ 1 ðs 2 1Þ wðĥÞ 2 wðE½hÞ ½ for s ∈ 1, 2 f g,
with v(⋅) and w(⋅) strictly increasing. The designer chooses s ∈ f1, 2g to maximize allocative efficiency, E[V ]. The interpretation is that there is muddled informationsome benchmark first market that always observes the signal-for example, the loan market in the credit-scoring application. Showing the signal to this market corresponds to baseline stakes of s 5 1 and gives agents a payoff vðĥÞ. Agents also participate in a second market-for example, automobile insurance-in which the signal may or may not be observed. If the signal is not observed (s 5 1), the agent gets a payoff w(E[h]) in the second market. If the signal is observed (s 5 2), the agent gets a payoff wðĥÞ in the second market. The key condition is that information is more socially valuable in the first market. In particular, let v(⋅) be strictly convex and let w(⋅) be linear. (Taking w to be approximately linear but with a small amount of convexity would give similar results; a concave w would only strengthen the point.) There is a positive social value of information in the first market in that more information implies higher allocative efficiency. For example, in the loan market, it efficient to make more, or larger, loans to lowerfinancial-risk consumers. In the second market, though, any information just redistributes surplus across types. For example, in the market for auto insurance, lower-financial-risk consumers receive lower rates because this is correlated with their filing fewer claims, but (almost) no people are on the margin of car ownership based on their insurance rates. So information about financial risk leads to monetary transfers in the auto market but does not affect allocations.
By construction, there is no direct effect on allocative efficiency in the second market from observing agents' actions. The only effect on allocative efficiency is the indirect effect on the first market. Our analysis implies that higher stakes lead to a less informative signal, and therefore lower allocative efficiency. We have argued for this comparative static result in a number of ways throughout the paper; a precise statement obtains, for example, in the 2 Â 2 setting using proposition 1: Corollary 1. Consider the 2 Â 2 setting with t 5 h. Let V(⋅) be of the form (6), with v(⋅) strictly convex and w(⋅) linear. For any equilibrium under s 5 2, there exists an equilibrium under s 5 1 with weakly higher allocative efficiency, E[V ].
In other words, to support the efficiency of the "loan" market in which information about natural actions is socially valuable, the signal should be hidden from the "auto insurance" market in which the social value is negligible. There is, of course, a converse: if the dimension of interest were the gaming ability rather than the natural action, then revealing the signal to a second market would generate a positive informational externality on the first market. The designer might want to show the agent's action to the purely redistributive second market just to ramp up stakes, which would increase gaming and information about gaming ability.
In appendix B, we analyze informational externalities when information is equally valuable across markets: all markets have the same convex v(⋅) function. There is now a direct allocative benefit as well as an indirect cost when a new market observes signals. We study whether allocative efficiency is maximized by showing signals to as many markets as possible, or whether there is an interior optimum after which the benefit to new markets is outweighed by the cost to existing markets. Of course, a designer interested in agent welfare-allocative efficiency minus signaling costs-would also consider the cost efficiency that lower stakes confer through less gaming.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has studied a model of signaling with two-dimensional types and one-dimensional actions. Equilibria typically confound the two dimensions of an agent's type: there is muddled information. In a nutshell, we find that when stakes increase, there is less equilibrium information about the agent's natural action and more information about her gaming ability. We have argued that this simple but robust finding provides insight into a number of applications and yields a novel trade-off regarding how information such as credit scores should be regulated across markets. We close by noting some additional issues.
Our comparative statics on information stem from costs of signaling being driven by the natural action at low actions and the gaming ability at high actions. Specifically, we assumed that for any given pair of cross types, the ratio of marginal costs for the type with higher natural action relative to the type with higher gaming ability is monotonically increasing in the action (assumption 1, part 4). As discussed in Section II.C, we believe this assumption is a good approximation for many applications, including those we have highlighted.
However, our framework also provides insight into settings where this marginal cost ratio is not everywhere increasing, or where signaling costs depend on more than two dimensions of a type. While obtaining global comparative statics is generally infeasible, it is possible to derive limiting results on information as stakes become large or small. Essentially, at low (respectively, high) stakes the market learns about the dimension that determines marginal costs at low (respectively, high) actions. Suppose, for instance, that musicians differ on natural talent and on quality of coaching. For untrained musicians, performance quality-or the cost of performance improvement-is determined by natural talent. As musicians begin to train and reach higher levels of performance, the quality of coaching becomes important. Finally, those at the highest levels have absorbed all coaching lessons, and performance improvements are again driven by differences in talent. We would then expect a nonmonotonic relationship between stakes and information about natural talent: very low and very high stakes generate precise information about natural talent.
muddled information
A simplification of our model is that an agent's action is directly observed by the market. In practice, markets sometimes only observe a noisy signal of an agent's action. For example, in test taking, agents choose effort that stochastically translates into the test score. Such noisy signaling would complicate the analysis but, we believe, not fundamentally change our main points.
Finally, our analysis of information yields direct implications for the allocative efficiency of equilibria. Other quantities are also of of interest. A promising avenue for future research is to explore the broader implications of multidimensional heterogeneity and muddled information in signaling games.
Appendix A Relating the Signaling Benefit to Consumer Demand
Here we illustrate how a benefit function V(⋅; s) may be derived from demand curves in a competitive market in which consumers have heterogeneous costs of service. The convexity of V relates to the efficiency improvement from firms' learning about consumer costs.
Example 2. A consumer chooses an action a that is observed by a competitive market of firms. Firms then offer the consumer a price p, and the consumer (mechanically) purchases a quantity given by the demand curve D(p, s). The stakes parameter s is a public and exogenous demand-shifter: ∂Dðp, sÞ=∂s > 0. The firms' expected cost of transacting with or serving the consumer depends on the consumer's type on the dimension of interest, t, with higher types having lower cost. Specifically, the service cost per unit is k 2 at, with the most costly consumer having t 5 t. The market is competitive, so the price offered to a consumer will equal the expected cost: p 5 k 2 at. A consumer who is thought to be typet receives gross consumer surplus V ðt; sÞ 5 Ð k2at k2at Dðk 2 at, sÞdt. Allocative efficiency-the expected consumer surplus-measures the full social value of information in this example, because firms receive no surplus. Agent (consumer) welfare, which is allocative efficiency minus expected costs of signaling, is total welfare.
If the consumer's demand curve were completely inelastic-D(p, s) independent of p-then V(⋅; s) would be linear. Additional information in the market would just transfer surplus from low to high types: a consumer of higher type would face a lower price and a consumer of lower type would face a higher price, but purchases would be unaffected. With a downward-sloping demand curve, information becomes socially valuable. A consumer with higher cost of service purchases less, as is efficient, while a consumer with lower cost of service purchases more. This induces a convex benefit function V(⋅; s).
Appendix B More on Informational Externalities across Markets
Revealing the agent's action to a new observer makes that observer more informed about the agent's type. But, as we argued in Section V.B, it can have an informational externality on others who already observed the agent's action. When the dimension of interest is the natural action, existing observers tend to become less informed when "the stakes are raised" by revealing the action to new observers.
Continuing from Section V.B, suppose an agent participates in a number of markets. Information about the agent's action may be revealed, or not, to each such market. Contrasting with the environment of corollary 1, however, information is socially valuable in all markets (i.e., strictly convex benefit functions); indeed, markets are homogeneous insofar as information is equally valuable in each market. There is no longer a way to reveal the agent's action to (more convex) high-value markets before revealing it to (less convex) low-value markets. Is the social value of information-allocative efficiency-maximized by showing signals to as many observers as possible, or is there is an interior optimum?
Throughout this appendix, let the dimension of interest be the natural action, h. Let V ðĥ; sÞ 5 svðĥÞ for vðĥÞ 5 wðĥÞ 2 wðE½hÞ, with w(⋅), and therefore v(⋅), strictly increasing, convex, and twice-differentiable. The designer chooses stakes s ≥ 0, and is interested in maximizing allocative efficiency E½V ðĥ; sÞ. For any given s, we focus on equilibria with the highest allocative efficiency. The interpretation of the benefit function V and the stakes s is that there are a large number of markets in which the agent participates. The agent's value as a function of beliefs is w(⋅) in each market, scaled by the size of the market. In a mass s of these markets, the agent's action is observed, in which case the beliefs on the agent's type areĥ. In all other markets, the agent's action is hidden, and beliefs remain at the prior E [h] . Showing the signal to a given market turns it from uninformed to informed, leading to a net agent benefit of vðĥÞ 5 wðĥÞ 2 wðE½hÞ. (We omit the constant payoff that the agent receives in the other uninformed markets.) The total value of information aggregated across markets is the value per observation, E [v] , times the mass of observers, s: E½V ðĥ; sÞ 5 sE½v.
The key assumption here is that the function determining the value of information, w(⋅), is homogeneous across markets. In the consumer pricing example (example 2 of app. A), the corresponding assumption would be that, up to linear scalings, the demand curve is identical across markets, and that beliefs on h yield the same prices across markets.
It is clear that if the market does not become uninformative in the limit as the stakes s become unboundedly large-if E½wðĥÞ stays bounded away from w(E[h]), or equivalently E½vðĥÞ is bounded away from 0-then the designer who cares about maximizing allocative efficiency should increase s without bound. 25 The trade-off between the marginal benefit and inframarginal cost of adding observers is only interesting when each observer becomes uninformed in the limit.
We analyze two simple settings. The first, as a proof of concept, shows that information is maximized at an interior s when the type space is a single pair of cross types. The second illustrates a richer type space in which h and g are independently distributed. There we find that it is optimal to take s → ∞: the gain from increasing information for marginal observers dominates the loss from worsening information for inframarginal observers.
A. Two Cross Types
When there are only two cross types, information is maximized at an interior value of the stakes s:
Proposition 6. Assume V 5 fv 1 , v 2 g, where v 1 and v 2 are cross types, and V ðĥ; sÞ 5 svðĥÞ with vðĥÞ 5 wðĥÞ 2 wðE½hÞ for some strictly convex w. The allocative efficiency sE [v] is maximized over choice of s and choice of equilibrium at some finite s > 0.
Recall from observation 1, part 1, that in a two-cross-types setting, there is an informative equilibrium for any s > 0 but the informativeness vanishes as s → ∞. In the current context, therefore, E½v > 0 at all s > 0 and E½v → 0 as s → ∞. We establish in the proof of proposition 6 (in app. SA.4.2) that sE½v → 0 as s → ∞.
B. Independent h and g
Now consider the case when h and g are independently distributed. The simplest specification with independent types that gets an uninformative limiting equilibrium (E½v → 0 as s → ∞) is when h has a binary distribution while g is continuously distributed; see proposition 2, part 3. Here we find that the designer would increase s without bound if he could, because even though allocative efficiency increases at a less-than-linear rate with s, it still grows without bound.
Proposition 7. Assume h and g are independent, V h 5 fh, hg, and g is continuously distributed. Let V ðĥ; sÞ 5 svðĥÞ with vðĥÞ 5 wðĥÞ 2 wðE½hÞ for some strictly convex w, and let Cða, h, gÞ 5 ðmaxfa 2 h, 0gÞ r =g for some r > 1. As s → ∞, there exists a sequence of equilibria with allocative efficiency sE½v → ∞.
We prove proposition 7 in appendix SA.4.2 by constructing a class of twoaction equilibria-all types take actions either at a 5 h or at some higher stakedependent action-in which E [v] goes to 0 at a limiting rate of s 22=ðr 11Þ , and hence allocative efficiency sE [v] increases at a limiting rate of s ðr 21Þ=ðr 11Þ . 26 In fact, the proof is more general than for independent types, and also establishes some other conditions under which allocative efficiency increases linearly in the stakes when the distribution of gaming abilities for high-h agents is in some sense above that of low-h agents.
Our analysis of homogeneous markets suggests that while it is possible to construct examples in which the social value of information is maximized by obscuring information from some observers, in more plausible settings the social value of information is maximized by showing signals to as many observers as possible. We stress, however, that our discussion ignores signaling costs. A designer who takes agents' signaling costs into account might prefer to hide information from some observers.
Proof Sketch of Lemma 3 in Section III.A
The proof of lemma 3 is in appendix SA.2.2. Here we provide a sketch.
A. Part 1 of Lemma 3
Let t 5 h, and fix some equilibrium at some s 0 > 0. It suffices to show that as s varies in a neighborhood of s 0 , we can perturb the equilibrium to be (weakly) more informative as s decreases and less informative as s increases.
For small changes in stakes, in many cases one can maintain the distribution of beliefs b t as stakes vary simply by continuously moving actions while not changing the (mixed) play of each type across these actions. For instance, as stakes go down, one may be able to go "left to right" decreasing each subsequent on-path action in a manner that keeps all of the relevant incentive constraints binding.
This approach fails when there is a pair of actions a 1 < a 2 such that two different types are both mixing over these actions. In that case it is impossible to move either of the actions without breaking one of the types' indifference. When this occurs, we hold a 1 and a 2 fixed as stakes vary; instead, we alter the mixing probabilities such that as stakes go down, (i) incentive constraints remain binding, and (ii) high-natural-action types are shifted to higher actions, and low-natural-action types are shifted to lower actions. Point ii ensures that the equilibrium becomes more informative about h as stakes are reduced: beliefs in the initial equilibrium were monotonic, and the perturbation spreads beliefs out further.
More specifically, the above situation involves the gamer (h, g) and the natural type ( h, g), both indifferent between actions a 1 ∈ ½h, a or Þ and a 2 ∈ ða or , a ce . Start from an equilibrium at stakes s 0 in which the gamer and the natural type both mix over actions a 1 and a 2 . There are two qualitative ways in which the mixing probabilities may need to be shifted while holding a 1 and a 2 fixed. First, suppose that at stakes s 0 the gamer strictly prefers a 1 over any action below a 1 . A reduction in stakes makes a 1 , which has a lower market belief, relatively more appealing than a 2 , which has a higher belief. To recover indifferences, we adjust the mixing probabilities so that the gamer shifts some mass from a 2 to a 1 while the natural type shifts from a 1 to a 2 . Since t 5 h, this increases the belief at a 2 and reduces the belief at a 1 , making a 2 relatively more appealing once more. See figure C1 , panel A; in the figure, parentheses indicate that there may be a mass of such types taking actions in some range. Second, suppose that at stakes s 0 the gamer is indifferent between a 1 and an action below a 1 ; in equilibrium, this lower action will be h. A reduction in stakes makes a 5 h relatively more attractive than a 1 , and also makes a 1 more attractive than a 2 . We can adjust mixing probabilities by having the gamer move some mass from a 2 to h, improving beliefs at a 2 , and then move from mass from a 1 to h, improving beliefs at a 1 . Once again, this change recovers indifferences and increases information. See figure C1 , panel B. QED
B. Part 2 of Lemma 3
Let t 5 h, and fix some equilibrium at some s 0 > 0. We argue that as stakes increase in a neighborhood, we can perturb the equilibrium to (weakly) increase information. Analogously to the proof sketch of lemma 3, part 1, in many cases one can maintain the distribution of beliefs b t as stakes increase by going "left to right" and increasing actions while not changing the behavior of each type across these actions.
This approach fails when the gamer (h, g) and the natural type ( h, g) are both indifferent over on-path actions a 1 ∈ ½h, a or Þ and a 2 ∈ ða or , a ce . When this occurs, we hold a 1 and a 2 fixed as stakes vary; instead, we alter the mixing probabilities such that as stakes increase, (i) incentive constraints remain binding, and (ii) highgaming-ability types are shifted to higher actions, and low-gaming-ability types are shifted to lower actions. Point ii ensures that the equilibrium becomes more informative about g as stakes are increased. More specifically, an increase in stakes makes action a 2 (with higher belief) relatively more appealing than a 1 FIG. C1.-A 2 Â 2 setting, t 5 h: Perturbing an equilibrium to become more informative as s decreases. Panel A shows when the gamer type h g does not have an incentive to take an action below a 1 . Panel B shows when the gamer type h g has an incentive to take an action below a 1 .
FIG. C2.-A 2 Â 2 setting, t 5 g: Perturbing an equilibrium to become more informative as s increases.
(with lower belief). So, we shift a high-gaming-ability type-either the gamer or the type ( h, g)-who had previously been playing a 2 to an action a 3 above a 2 . This change reduces the belief at a 2 , recovering the indifference between a 1 and a 2 . See figure C2 , where parentheses indicate that there may be a mass of such types taking the specified action. QED Appendix D Additional Results and Proofs for Section III.B Lemma 4. Assume t 5 h. Fix any two cross types, v 1 5 ðh, gÞ and v 2 5 ð h, gÞ with h < h and g < g, with the corresponding cost-equalizing action a ce . Across all type spaces V containing {v 1 , v 2 } and across all equilibria, it holds that ifĥ i is some belief that v i induces in equilibrium (i 5 1, 2), then V ðĥ 2 ; sÞ 2 V ðĥ 1 ; sÞ ≤ Cða ce , v 1 Þ 5 Cða ce , v 2 Þ.
A. Proof of Lemma 4
Fix any type space containing v 1 and v 2 , and any equilibrium in which each v i (i 5 1, 2) uses action a i inducing beliefĥ i . Ifĥ 2 ≤ĥ 1 then the result is trivially true, so supposeĥ 2 >ĥ 1 . By belief monotonicity, a 1 < a 2 . Incentive compatibility implies Cða 2 , v 2 Þ 2 Cða 1 , v 2 Þ ≤ V ðĥ 2 ; sÞ 2 V ðĥ 1 ; sÞ ≤ Cða 2 , v 1 Þ 2 Cða 1 , v 1 Þ. Hence, V ðĥ 2 ; sÞ 2 V ðĥ 1 ; sÞ is bounded above by the maximum of Cða 2 , v 1 Þ 2 Cða 1 , v 1 Þ subject to a 2 ≥ a 1 and Cða 2 , v 1 Þ 2 Cða 1 , v 1 Þ ≥ Cða 2 , v 2 Þ 2 Cða 1 , v 2 Þ. Lemma 1 implies that the constraint is violated if a 2 > a ce ; hence the maximum is obtained when a 2 5 a ce and a 1 5 h. QED
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1: V h is finite by hypothesis. We claim that for small enough s > 0 there is an equilibrium in which every v 5 ðh, gÞ takes its natural action, a 5 h; any off-path action a ∉ V h is assigned the belieft 5 min V h . Clearly, no type has a profitable deviation to any off-path action or to any action below its natural action. It suffices to show that there is no incentive for any type to deviate to any on-path action above its natural action (an "upward deviation") when s > 0 is small enough. The proposition's hypotheses about V imply there is an ε > 0 such that Cða, h, gÞ > ε for all ðh, gÞ ∈ V and a ∈ V h \ ðh, ∞Þ. For any type, the gain from deviating to any action is bounded above by V ðmax V h ; sÞ 2 V ðmin V h ; sÞ, which, by assumption 2, tends to 0 as s → 0. It follows that for small enough s > 0, the cost of any upward deviation outweighs the benefit for all types. Part 2: The result follows from lemma 4 and part 3 of assumption 2. Part 3: Given an equilibrium, letĥðvÞ denote a belief induced by type v. Given a sequence of equilibria as s → ∞, letĥ * ðvÞ denote any limit point of such beliefs as s → ∞ (passing to subsequence if necessary). We first claim that in any sequence of equilibria, it holds for any v 0 5 ðh 0 , g 0 Þ and v 00 5 ðh 00 , g 00 Þ with g 00 > g 0 that h * ðv 00 Þ ≥ĥ * ðv 0 Þ; in words, in the limit any type with a higher gaming ability induces a weakly higher belief about its natural action. If h 00 ≥ h 0 , the claim follows from the fact that v 00 and v 0 are ordered by single crossing and hence v 00 must induce when s >s, first consider local incentive constraints among the on-path actions. Plainly, no type wants to deviate upward, because (h max , g i ) is by construction indifferent between playing a i and a i11 , while all other (h, g i ) types prefer a i to a i11 . No type wants to deviate downward because a i11 ðsÞ > a ce i ; hence the indifference of (h max , g i ) between a i and a i11 implies that for any h, type (h, g i11 ) prefers a i11 to a i . Standard arguments using the single-crossing property on dimension g then imply global incentive compatibility among on-path actions. Finally, off-path actions can be deterred by assigning them the lowest belief, g 1 .
Part 2: The result follows from lemma 5 and part 3 of assumption 2. Part 3: The argument is analogous to that provided for proposition 2, part 3, switching g and h, taking s → 0 rather than s → ∞, and using lemma 5 to conclude that in the limit of vanishing stakes, any type with a higher natural action induces a weakly higher belief about its gaming ability. QED
